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CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP AND THE SUCCESSION TO MAO TSE-TUNG: AN APPRAISAL OF TENSIONS

By
John Wilson Lewis
Department of Government
Cornell University

External Research Staff
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The Director of Intelligence and Research

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

New light is shed on the tensions and cleavages within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party by the "Military Papers," secret Chinese Communist journals recently made available to scholars. This subject gains added importance through its relationship to the problem of the succession to the aging elite that centers around Mao Tse-tung. Dr. John Wilson Lewis, a student of Chinese Communist government, has examined inner-Party relationships, relying primarily upon the "Military Papers." His analysis is one of a series of Policy Research Studies done under contract for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in association with the Policy Planning Council.

Thomas L. Hughes

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ABSTRACT

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP AND THE SUCCESSION TO MAO TSE-TUNG: AN APPRAISAL OF TENSIONS

John Wilson Lewis

Factions in the Chinese Communist Party

The "Military Papers" do not disprove that factions exist among the present Chinese Communist Party elite, but they do seriously undermine the conclusion that factions exist in the manner commonly assumed by outside experts. In contrast, internal and international tensions appear to have contributed to a limited split between the younger and older generations and to have increasingly divorced the Party from the Chinese people.

Difficulties of the Post-Liberation Period

The change of the Party's role from competitor to conqueror fundamentally recast the nature of Party struggle and the Party's revolutionary mission. Although Mao held in 1948 and 1949 that the revolution must continue despite the Party's imminent seizure of power and demanded a continuation of the "mass line style of work" created in the years of war, he recognized that temptations and corrupting influences would follow in the wake of victory. After 1949 the elite searched frantically for suitable forms of contrived struggle which could take the place of the "special characteristics of war." The attempt to continue revolution in a period of reconstruction and economic planning apparently tested the Party's faith that the average cadre's commitment and Party zeal would survive the end of armed revolution. In 1955, Kao Kang and eight other leaders in the Northeast region were condemned for challenging the central authority in the Party; and in 1959, P'eng Te-huai was dismissed for opposing political control in the Army. Between 1957 and 1963, criticism by intellectuals and dissidence among the cadres resulted in stringent disciplinary measures and increased periods of indoctrination for young people.

Unity and Diversity

The central theme urged upon the young Party members was expressed in the Leninist slogan, "combine collective leadership with individual responsibility." The Party leaders held that the "subjective forces" of personal will and ideological consciousness remained as determinants of all progress and that no material condition could in theory long resist the manipulation of a united leadership which had a basic understanding of dialectical materialism. The attainment of a balance of unity with diversity is expressed as "democratic centralism." It principle, Party members must both engage in debate actively and support the decisions of the central elite, for all central decisions by definition are the "correct" resolution of two erroneous trends. It is fairly clear, however, that under Mao "losers" in policy debates will receive unceasing indoctrination and scrutiny to deter them from joining forces as an identifiable faction. As the Party has tightened its discipline and training procedures, it has simultaneously opened up other means for the expression of diversity; greater freedom from political study is granted to technical and scientific cadres, and there has been a return to traditional village ties in placing and advancing the basic-level cadres of the Party.

Conflict Between Generations

The operational methods and formal institutions of the present leadership, which originated in the 1920's and have been kept alive for their cherished historical associations, are now the framework for inner-Party tensions. The pre-1949 members of the Party consider themselves a distinctive generation and are distrustful of their potential heirs. Although they have consciously cultivated a heterogeneous membership in order to obtain the widest range of information and talent, the need for diversity has made them acutely sensitive to the ever-present possibility of factionalism. The problem of unity did not reach major proportions until 1949, when the Party began to bring large numbers of the young into its ranks and thereby precipitated dissatisfaction and antagonism among veteran cadres and Party members who were displaced by ambitious youngsters. The problem of a

split between the elder generation and the lower and middle ranks poses ever-greater difficulties. Rewards for production and technical achievements will tend to undermine purely political and ideological appeals. Hence contradictory policies affect the motives of the post-1949 generation and tend to undercut programs for instilling revolutionary zeal. While distinctions between their responsibilities, liabilities, and adjustments have tended to create cohesiveness and common identity at the highest and also at the lowest levels of the Party, absence of this clear difference has tended to weaken cohesion and identity at the middle levels, the ones most likely to provide the successors to the senior elite. At these middle levels there is no coincidence of background and attitude, and the Party leaders have not elaborated doctrine for this group.

Succession to Mao Tse-tung

The rising tensions between the two generations of Party members and their impact on the middle group have particularly clouded the problem of succession to the Maoist leadership. The Mao-led elite is aging and several members might die in rapid sequence. The ages of the 18 full members of the Political Bureau, for example, average 64 years and those of the six alternates average 60 years. A group fully identified with the revolutionary elite and its strategies and techniques could carry on, however, for at least another ten to fifteen years. Of the original 4.5 million "pre-liberation" generation of Party members in 1949, approximately 3.4 million were in the Party in 1961, and the presumption has been that they fill the majority of the more than 300,000 cadre posts in the Party at the hsien (county) level and above, as well as most of the equivalent posts in the governmental, military, and economic apparatus. Although the present elite must award an increasingly higher percentage of the more authoritative posts to the "post-liberation" members, a sharp break in the revolutionary traditions of Mao's inner circle in the Political Bureau is not probable for five or ten years. By that time a substantial number of Party members from the present middle-levels that are not closely associated ideologically with the "pre-revolutionary" group could attain to the top positions.

Effect of International Situation on Domestic Tensions

The first seven months of 1963 brought into full focus the Chinese Communist attitudes on international relations and revealed more fully than before the intensity of Chinese Communist bitterness toward the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists remain committed to their own interpretations of doctrine and to their self-proclaimed status as the "foremost model" for the national revolutionary movement. They consider disagreement with the Soviet Union to be a natural phenomenon in communist relations. The crisis in Communist China's international position has tended to reduce internal friction at the highest levels and to limit other tensions within the country. The exact effect of international politics on domestic tensions, however, is unclear. A general tone of uncertainty and anxiety pervades those sections of the "Military Papers" which deal with international relations and runs sharply counter to the sense of direction and correctness which supposedly comes to those who adhere to doctrine.

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John Wilson Lewis
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I. INTRODUCTION

The documents used in this study of tensions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership cover a broad selection of sources. A set of "Military Papers" provided the most important new insights. These papers consist of 29 issues of the Kung Tso T'ung Hsün, or Work Correspondence, a secret periodical issued irregularly by the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, and cover the period from January 1 to August 26, 1961.[1] Although these journals reveal little general information of an unexpected nature, they contain many verifying and amplifying statements and bring to light certain episodes and facts, such as a major rebellion in Honan, the great number of military accidents and widespread maltreatment of non-Party people by lower-level cadres. In general, the journals provide key checks on knowledge derived from open sources and thus cannot be read profitably in isolation. Stated differently, the "Military Papers" represent only one part of the overall reading intake of higher- and middle-level cadres. Their full importance can be appreciated only when they are weighed with the considerable accumulation of open evidence, and in the selection of material used in this study an attempt has been made to balance the various kinds of documents which might illuminate the state of inner-Party tensions in Communist China.

The judicious balancing of kinds of documents, however, is only one way to sift the "reality" from Communist sources. Such a sifting requires alternative approaches, none of which is wholly satisfactory when used alone. For example, Party statements are analyzed in this study in the light of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history. The purpose of this historical examination is to demonstrate that the complicated and somewhat contradictory events in the Party's past probably explain a great deal of the current outlook of the major CCP leaders and their excessive concern with doctrine. Although somewhat tedious to recount, the background analysis in section II of this report provides an indispensable foundation for an intensive examination of tensions.

In this background analysis, as well as in section III, attempts are made to refute or at least to cast doubt on lines of argument which have led serious analysts of Chinese Communist politics to conclude that factions exist among the present-day Chinese Communist Party elite.[2] So much of the evidential material used by these analysts can be easily explained by doctrinal positions adopted during the Yenan period (1936-49) or before that a question arises concerning the apparent need to discount doctrine in favor of less supportable explanations. Moreover, in the light of the years of struggle and sacrifice outlined below, official doctrine does appear to play an important role as a belief system in Communist China, and one cannot conclude without substantial proof that individual leaders are independent actors psychologically free to select patterns of behavioral norms strikingly at odds with doctrine. CCP doctrine does not, of course, determine or even support all action, but it probably remains fundamental to actions and relationships in those areas that lie at the heart of the revolutionary experience. The handling of tensions within the elite perhaps best symbolizes such an area of revolutionary experience.

The major burden of this study is to appraise as systematically as possible the visible signs of tension in the Chinese Communist Party, rather than to attack the positions advanced by others. Nevertheless, it may prove helpful to set forth

briefly at the outset the problems which the theory of inner-Party factions presents. The problems are these: (1) official statements of individual leaders cannot--from what is known of the Chinese Communist Party history--be taken as representing personal opinion. It is known from the writings of high-level defectors which have been published in Hong Kong and from the writings of others of the Kiangsi and Yenan periods that the Party frequently directs the most vocal opponent of an agreed policy to announce that policy after an agreement or decision has been reached in order to demonstrate his acceptance of organizational unity and doctrine. (2) A pattern of events may be explained according to various systems of logic and following an acknowledged set of premises. The theory of inner-Party factions assumes a high level of individual, logical (in the non-communist sense) rationality outside the known Marxist-Leninist patterns. This constitutes the errors of transferring one's own concepts to others and of assuming that others must conform to those concepts with a high level of consciousness. To repeat, disagreement and disunity can be explained quite satisfactorily according to principles of "struggle" which all the senior elite have endorsed in statements and actions for more than twenty-five years. (3) What Americans presume would be their response to purge for failures does not necessarily correspond to the response of Communist Chinese who have been raised in a closed belief system sustained by a sense of sin and personal inadequacy. The analyst cannot assume, that is, that since he would not degrade himself as Li Li-san and P'eng Te-huai apparently have done, therefore they must not be sincere. Repentance in belief systems is well documented and on balance has the effect of revitalizing and strengthening the organization which demands it. (4) Functional assignments--to the Party apparatus, to economic or administrative units, or to the People's Liberation Army (PLA)--do not necessarily evoke patterns of group interest comparable to non-communist situations. That Chou En-lai, for example, talks more about administration than about Party politics is a function of his job, not of his ideological fervor. On the lower levels, at least, the administrators are also expected to be more reticent about grandiose schemes and are required before decision to voice their reservations. A problem may come after decision and when blame is assigned in cases of failure. Ideology precludes the failure of the "system" or the "objective process" by definition, but it cannot be assumed that those who believe in the ideology readily accept blame in situations beyond their real control. And (5) the theory of factions neglects other crucial fissures in the apparatus which exist between high- and middle-level cadres whose life experiences and career expectations differ markedly.

In contrast to the thesis that potent factions exist within the Chinese Communist elite, it is argued in this study that internal and international tensions have contributed to a split within the Party in a limited way along "generational" lines and have increasingly divorced the Party from the Chinese people. But, this study too will not account for all points at issue or explain all tensions expressed within the Party. It cannot be expected that every person and event will fit a consistent, logical pattern, though it is hoped that this study might provide a better "fit" than the theory of factions and might avoid some of the problems that have attended that theory.

II. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS

This analysis of Chinese Communist history begins with an examination of the "typical" senior Party leaders and the landmark developments in their thinking. The memories of the present leadership elite as well as its operational habits and formal institutions may be usefully traced to the 1920's and have been kept vividly alive as treasured legacies, particularly in the aftermath of the successive domestic and international shocks suffered since 1959. These memories and habits establish the operational framework for inner-Party tensions and must be understood in order to appreciate the limits on those tensions. Furthermore, those assumptions under which Mao Tse-tung fought for and consolidated his power provide the most likely assumptions which will operate at the time Mao's successor is picked.

Most of the central Party members who clustered around Mao in the Party's formative years faced the unending tasks of organizational and propaganda struggle and operated largely along local lines which were only partially dictated by the Central Committee. In the early 1920's Mao's arena of action sharply contrasted with the Central Committee's bureaucratic world of paper edicts, factional feuds, and Russian manipulation. This sharp contrast provided the context in which Mao first formulated the techniques of the "mass line," a process of action designed to create mutual support and a workable relationship between Party functionaries or cadres and the Chinese people.

In Mao's early works he pointed with pride to the concrete results of the mass line tactics and implicitly criticized the bureaucratic methods of the central leadership and that leadership's failure to establish a meaningful linkage with the peasant population. Thus challenged, the Central Committee dropped Mao from its roster for several months in 1927. With the reversal of Party fortunes during mid-1927, however, Mao seized the opportunity to place the mass line in fairly widespread operation when he and Chu Teh fell heirs to the only significant military forces that survived the series of suppression campaigns engineered by Chiang Kai-shek. Faced with imminent annihilation, Mao turned with new certainty and urgency to the mass line techniques which had proved effective in the pre-1927 years. Moreover, he sought to incorporate in the mass line formula additional practical schemes for expanding genuine popular support and for ensuring the firm commitment and loyal response of the Party members.

Although the military struggle itself provided the final test of these mass line methods and of the policy decisions which they were designed to implement, Mao regularly stated that military successes rested on local-level political gains and had meaning only in political terms. On the other hand, armed revolution comprised a special context for the development of political habits and was necessary to sustain the Party's political role. Mao placed unusual emphasis on the military requirements of the revolutionary war, particularly after the full-scale Japanese invasion of 1937, despite the fact that he consistently rejected the "purely military viewpoint" and stipulated that the political outlook formed the fundamental basis of any successful military operation. Military power would lead to political power ("political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"), but revolutionary military power in turn depended on the "conscious activity" of cadre commanders and the political mobilization of the populace as well as on a realistic appraisal of the "special characteristics" of war.[3] Mao said:

> From the special characteristics of war arise special organizations, a special series of methods and a special process.... Hence war experiences are of a special kind. All participants in war must free themselves from ordinary habits and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.[4]

Maoist writers have elaborated the critical role of the special breed of participant cadres freed from "ordinary habits" and accustomed to revolutionary war. As stated by one source in 1961: "Our party is a fighting party. In the past the military became the school for training cadres for the Party. Our party was formed by carrying guns and bayonets."[5] Although Mao held in 1948 and 1949 that the revolution must continue despite the Party's imminent seizure of power and demanded a continuation of the mass line "style of work" created in the years of war, he recognized the temptations and corrupting influences that would follow in the wake of victory, and after 1949 the elite searched frantically for suitable forms of contrived struggle which could take the place of "the special characteristics of war." According to the exigencies of the continuous revolution doctrine, the Party leaders attempted to recruit a post-victory generation of highly active youth and to favor these youth in assignments and promotions. Older members had to adapt to the demands of socialist construction and could not adopt the superior attitude of the "meritorious veteran." Nonetheless, only a small percentage of the pre-1949 members were actually purged, and senior Party posts invariably went to cadres who had joined the Party during the revolutionary war years. (This subject is discussed more fully below.) All regular members of the Eighth Central Committee elected in 1956, for example, joined the Party prior to 1938, and their long military careers gave them both a sense of common identity and an underlying distrust of those not similarly identified. Thus complex conditions and emotions prompted Party leaders after 1949 to remold the new members of the elite in their own image.

The human problems and tactical aspects of revolutionary war preoccupied Mao's generation of Party leaders. The terms of their ideology had made the reasons for seizing power superficially self-evident, and communist writers, generally speaking, had paid little attention to concrete, long-range political objectives and programs. Genuine concern for the more detailed elaboration of the purposes behind their ideologically motivated revolution did not appear until 1942, when the Party launched the study and rectification campaigns. By this time fourteen years had passed since Mao had started to rebuild the Party apparatus shattered in 1927, and, when formulated, the long-range purposes were consciously shaped to established habits and values. Indeed, in one sense, the habits, values, and techniques developed in the 1927-41 period constituted the lasting elements of the Party's program above and beyond transient military and political goals. Mao did not elaborate a complete statement of purposes until he delivered his report to the Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, "On Coalition Government," but this report ranks far below his "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party," which was written in the same month and in which the Party's historical experiences were recapitulated and evaluated in order to provide orthodox guidelines for the future. By the time victory had been achieved in 1949, the Party had spent relatively little time examining how power might be exercised because of the persistent belief among the senior Party leaders that in essence the use of power after victory would require the same revolutionary habits and techniques. New goals and opportunities would necessitate the adoption of additional skills but would not invalidate the fundamental character of the revolutionary methods of leadership.

For these and many other reasons, the Chinese Communist Party typified the professional revolutionary party organized for its own interests and for the successful seizure of power. The dynamic quality implicit in the original mission

of revolutionary victory, moreover, outlasted the wartime context that made the quality meaningful and useful and after 1949 gave the Party an unreal image of itself and its mission. What distinguished the Chinese elite from its Soviet counterpart, however, was the operational bridge formed between the Chinese Party cadres and the general population, particularly the peasantry. Only the Chinese Communists have hallowed memories of great victories won because of the unity and dedication of Communist Party members in combination with the loyalty of the ordinary people. The Russian Communist Party, by operating largely in secret before the 1917 revolution, developed a clandestine style of leadership operation that was only moderately effective, although Lenin, among others, derived important advantages from his leadership skills when engaged in inner-Party combat abroad. Tsarist police methods isolated Russian Party members from one another and from the general populace and kept the Russian Communists in hiding until the very eve of their rise to power. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, worked openly in "base areas" and had to emphasize comradely unity and dedication in order to survive during periods of deprivation and combat.

The period from 1927 to 1941 provided the intensive, wartime climate in which the Chinese Communists could refine and retail the structural and operational aspects of the mass line method. These aspects were consciously passed on to the Party recruits admitted after the end of the 1934-35 Long March and the beginning of the Party reconstruction phase in Yenan. The necessity for a more systematic education of the members in ideological and leadership principles increased with the influx of new members after 1936 and became critical in the aftermath of the disastrous Japanese terror campaigns which followed the famous Hundred Regiments Offensive of the Eighth Route Army in 1940. In these campaigns, the Party lost thousands of its best operatives and members. Thus weakened--and further threatened by an internecine struggle with leftover elements of the pre-Mao Central Committee--the Party high command inaugurated the movements for study and rectification. It lauded the conscious, dedicated mass line style of work and rigorously passed on the abstracted principles of its 1927-41 revolutionary experiences. The educational effort brought renewed commitment to doctrine within the membership and perpetuated in idealized form the elite's preoccupation with unity and directed zeal. The environment of military struggle helped to justify the mass line principles and to keep them at the center of attention.

Firm commitment and mass line leadership thus comprised the prescribed norms to guide the conduct of the generation of Party members and cadres who entered the Chinese Communist Party prior to the 1949 victory, and their élan and style of leadership constituted the distinctive badge of their revolutionary struggle. Although different experiences--Chingkangshan, Kiangsi, the Long March, Yenan, the anti-Japanese War, and the post-1945 civil war--often were used to divide the pre-1949 members into important subgroups, the genuine emotional attachment to the general revolutionary war provided a common mark of identity. Here lay the core of the attainments and values of the group. On this basis they have justified a lifetime of combat.

Many documents read in the preparation of this study reveal the extent to which the pre-1949 members of the Party have become a distinctive generation in their own eyes. In one significant document, for example, the higher echelon of military commanders exposed the general prejudices and attitudes of the revolutionary elite and that elite's latent distrust of its potential heirs. This example highlighted the revolutionary generation's concern with the lack of revolutionary fervor among the "second generation." One statement is typical:

> That everyone will sooner or later die is a natural law. It is also a rule that a human being coming from nature will return to nature. Consequently, it is necessary for us to

> leave some records and this document on ordinances is one of the things to be passed on to the second generation. It is a document of our collected experiences but we shall have to make every effort and present it in a more complete form.

But, then the mood changes to a condemnation of the ungrateful heirs: "Purposely our leaders at the meeting paid much attention to those who did not applaud although loud applause was given by the majority; some applauded in a forced manner." Failure to applaud properly, the report stated, indicated "disagreement or partial dissatisfaction" or at the very least that "some had their own opinions."[6] The significant ramifications of the generational problem will be discussed below in section IV.

Within the rigid normative framework which demanded comradely unity and concrete leadership techniques common to all members, the Party accommodated its strategies to the daily struggle and to the opportunities of the struggle itself. One dimension of opportunity, for example, pertained to the recruitment of a diverse cross section of the Chinese population into the ranks of the Party. Some of those who presented themselves for membership came from the chance Kuomintang captives or from the rank-and-file of the Red Army. Others--particularly young students and intellectuals--deliberately sought action against the Japanese and were genuinely attracted to the Party by its promises of national salvation or saw in the Party the only answer to China's chaotic problems. And a third group were actively recruited by the Party leaders to fill particular needs in the membership roster.

Given the scope of the Chinese Communist military-political-economic enterprise, the diversity of personalities, backgrounds, and skills among potential Party recruits represented an extraordinary asset. Mao's cadres consciously cultivated a heterogeneous membership in order to give the leadership the widest range of information and talent. Such talent could be based on specialized training or on a knowledge of local conditions, and both kinds of talent gave the Party essential supports for situational flexibility and local adaptability. The very heterogeneity of the recruits, however, necessitated even greater stress on ideological indoctrination to provide the indispensable common base of a single operational language and set of criteria for judging the reliability of members in various alternative kinds of crises. The Party needed to maximize and encourage useful differences, but it wanted to make certain that the differences would be used for Party purposes, would not interfere with the transmission of orders, and would not undermine membership solidarity or otherwise serve as the basis for factions.

The need for diversity thus helped to shape the underlying identity and uniformity of the revolutionary generation and made it acutely sensitive to the ever-present possibility of factionalism. In the final section of his famous 1945 report, "On the Party," Liu Shao-ch'i attempted to clarify the optimum balance of rigidity and flexibility within Party ranks. The organizations of the Party, Liu said, "on the one hand, should unite with all the revolutionary classes and democratic parties and groups throughout the country to struggle for victory; and, on the other hand, it should strengthen its ranks and increase its rigidity ideologically, politically, and organizationally to distinguish it from all other political parties." He added that "the vanguard of the proletariat must possess flexibility because it has to establish the closest connection with the masses...and know how to coordinate the fundamental and partial interests of the people as well as the different forms of struggle and organization." In due course--particularly after the surface unity of the Party had masked the deterioration of regional diversity into Kao Kang's "anti-Party" factionalism--the Chinese Communist theoreticians,

drawing on Marxist-Leninist classics, ritualized and circumscribed this combination of unity and diversity in the dialectical principles of "democratic centralism" and collective leadership.

To fashion a system based on close "comradeship" and genuine participation, the Party leaders placed unusual emphasis on the quality of life within the Party organizations. Mao Tse-tung realized from the early Chingkangshan period (1927-30) that habits formed within tradition-bound villages, clans, and families or other kin-like groups could mislead the Party member as he interpreted the Party's pleas for close personal relations and closely integrated social groups. Moreover, the diverse membership would inevitably produce important differences of opinion on vital questions. If disgruntled by unfavorable decisions, minority elements of closely integrated members would probably enlist support among friends, and the pattern would be set for factions. Unity with diversity, therefore, if wrongly conceived or badly implemented, could simply deteriorate into irremedial feuds and clan-type warfare. Mao learned the bitter lesson of factionalism in the period from 1921 to 1935 and explicitly denounced his predecessors in the leadership elite for their failures to eliminate factions and divisive tendencies as well as for their failures to adopt mass line tactics.

The amorphous but unified nature of the Party elite posed numerous problems for the Party in addition to the basic problem of eradicating family-like habits among CCP members. The most important of these problems concerned the conduct of inner-Party debate. In theory, Mao explained and justified the likely occurrence of dissension within the Party by recourse to the dogma of contradictions. "If in the Party there were neither contradictions nor ideological struggles to solve them, the Party's life would come to an end," Mao stated in 1937.[7] Four years later, this and similar statements helped provide the rationale for the instructions in the work On Inner-Party Struggle, written by Liu Shao-ch'i to guide the Party members in the conduct of "principled struggle." In general, the CCP elite encouraged the continuation of diversity and membership debate when they occurred within the organization and--as judged by the leading cadres--would contribute to the unity and revolutionary direction of the Party. Open expression of different viewpoints prior to decision was mandatory, not simply tolerated. "Struggle" using criticism and self-criticism became indispensable for strict discipline and education. Moreover, specialists in different military and civilian posts were required to state their divergent views and reservations on possible courses of action, and from the general debate would come the unified or "summed up" Party line--the policy estimate of the actions required to achieve military-political victory. Party rules required unflinching agreement after decision had been taken; public opposition was unthinkable, though some constitutional provisions allowed for appeals and local adjustments within the context of absolute obedience. At the time of the announcement of a policy--as at a National Party Congress or Central Committee plenum--the various specialists might explain different aspects of the decision. In such speeches, points made by one speaker would not need to be duplicated by others--and frequently are not--but a Party platform could never be used for the presentation, however subtly implied, of individual opposition or reservations. The whole body might "go slow" or "move radically"; no leading Chinese Communist, to the author's knowledge, has ever publicly since 1945 urged one speed when the policy was clearly in favor of a different speed. Thus all Party leaders were somewhat cautious in their analyses of socialist construction in 1956, and all--including Chou En-lai--were in favor of "going all out and pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical results" in 1958.

Regulated by a realistic interpretation of "inner-Party struggle" and debate, the apparently contradictory elements in the political organization of the Party on balance constituted its strength in the wartime revolutionary environment.

Wide diversity and active participation with a unified purpose and direction greatly enhanced the fighting power of the scattered forces of the Red Army and Communist partisans. The rapid influx of new members into the organizations after 1942, however, prevented the simple reliance on the "natural" environment of war to galvanize the varied elements of the Party into an effective, unified leadership force. Education and indoctrination also proved inadequate when used alone because of the unusual length of time needed to transform the "ideological level" of the new recruits and because of the need to press Party members into action quickly. Thus the Party consistently fell back on enforced discipline to ensure the correct performance of members who were making the transition to the self-regulated Communist style of work. Not everyone could shed the Confucian habits of narrow family allegiance and exclusiveness, and many found it difficult to adjust to the face-shattering ritual of struggle with unity ("unity-criticism-unity").

Many did successfully adopt the Communist qualities, however, and did manage the balance of unity with diversity. For these, as suggested above, the implied discipline of war and the high adventure and drama of combat proved to be an indispensable substitute for enforced personal discipline, and it was these CCP members who attained the core elite under Mao Tse-tung. War--even the post-victory "war" on internal "evil elements"--justified their passion and their Spartan dedication. In their words, it enabled them to accept direction yet feel free and to subordinate themselves to the whole yet remain leaders of their own local areas. The slogan "democratic centralism" expressed this balance of conflicting but indispensable qualities, and Party leaders long recognized the evils of imbalance--the extreme of factionalism or the extreme of unthinking and inflexible uniformity. Conflict, including ritualized conflict with the United States, helped keep the balance meaningful for the revolutionary generation of Party members.

As such, continued conflict is as much a holding operation as a positive technique of leadership manipulation. Although the manipulative aspects of inner-Party struggle may remain central to an understanding of the Chinese Communist leadership techniques, the psychological dimension of conflict reveals the vital "need" for struggle on the part of the elite itself. Struggle thus constitutes a two-edged sword: one edge to maintain the cohesion of the elite; the other to expand its influence. Should contrived struggle fail, the leadership might lose not only its influence but also its psychological bearings.

Therefore, an examination of the conscious struggle techniques many be usefully focused on the elite rather than simply on the interrelationship between the established leadership and its lower echelons, among whom it must now count its legatees. Indeed these techniques have not as yet had sufficient appeal or relevancy to convince the newer generation of Party members and working cadres that the explanations of "democratic centralism" are not vague abstractions and outmoded jargon. Because the reduction of political conflict to a routine series of movements has appeared unrelated to the real problems of economic construction and social development, most youth have failed to appreciate the subtle fact that struggle was as necessary for the peace of mind of the pre-1949 elite as it was for "thought control", and they have instead, as one might expect, viewed ideological struggle primarily as a mechanism of control. Moreover, the reluctance of the newer members to throw themselves joyously into group struggle has further convinced the older generation of its superior wisdom and critical responsibilities. In theory at least, the interplay of generational antagonisms would bring about greater cohesion in the revolutionary generation and might thereby further decrease its ability to identify with and make concesssons to the new generation.

III. THE POST-VICTORY THREAT TO COHESION: THE EMERGENCE OF AND REACTION TO FACTIONS

The significance of the Communist victory for the leadership elite may be measured in many ways. The target of almost thirty years of revolution had been realized. The Chinese people stood ready, by and large, to respond to vigorous direction, and the Party leaders faced the extraordinary task and challenge of rebuilding and remolding China. The change of the Party's role from competitor to conqueror also fundamentally recast the nature of Party struggle and the Party's revolutionary mission. CCP membership became routine and respected, the natural route to power and prestige. According to official CCP sources, the rewards of the victory would sorely tempt the displaced warriors of the Party and the People's Liberation Army and thereby corrupt their motives. "There may be some Communists, who were not conquered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets," Mao cautioned in 1949. "They will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets."[8]

It appears that, from the ideological point of view, the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 faced the sudden loss of the centralizing force of military discipline and wartime emergency. Economic and social struggle may have appeared only vaguely analogous to wartime combat even in the period of the Korean War, and many may have volunteered for duty in that war--this conclusion is suggested in such Communist sources as Study--because they felt lost and superfluous in the new China. Others found refuge in the traditional sanctuary of personal relationships and thus presumably provoked the Party to inaugurate within its ranks the "three anti" (san fan) campaign against corruption, waste, and bureaucracy.

The attempted continuation of revolution in a period of reconstruction and economic planning apparently tested the Party's faith that the average cadre's commitment and Party zeal transcended armed revolution. In Maoist theory, organizational "struggle," emotional exhortation, and periodic reform movements were readily adaptable to peacetime programs and could provide the same demanding context as war and evoke and justify the same balance of tensions. In this theory, the Party confidently established the Central People's Government and then turned over key operations to Party leaders strategically located in six major regional organizations. Analogous regional ("base area") organizations had served the Party in the period of the revolutionary war and appeared essential to meet the vastly different problems in the various parts of China after 1949.

Although the officials of the regions were viewed in Party sources as obedient, flexible instruments of the central leadership, it could be argued that the official sanction of the regional form of organization merely camouflaged power centers beyond the effective control of the Peking-based organization. Indeed, as it turned out in the Northeast and East China Bureaus, the official pronouncements on the common unity of the regions did mask the budding power faction of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, but no evidence exists on the official condonement of regional independence, and many of the statements on the Kao-Jao group in 1954 and 1955 indicate genuine surprise at the extent of the local power discovered in the regions. Given Mao's long preoccupation with and distaste for factions plus the heady atmosphere of total victory that prevailed in 1949, it seems rather unlikely that Mao would knowingly have allowed any Party organs to exist which were beyond his effective control.

The Party, military, and administrative heads of each of the regions were senior members of the Central Committee, and high-ranking Central Committeemen often held overlapping Party, military, and administrative posts. Although most of the regions had a large degree of autonomy according to the rank of the principal Party figure in the region and that region's peculiar problems and background, only the Northeast region achieved the status of a full-fledged regional government (on August 27, 1949), and it was in the Northeast that the basic assumptions concerning a workable balance of unity with diversity were flagrantly challenged. The extraordinary situation in the Northeast was complicated by three major factors: (1) the parallel structures of power with Kao Kang at each apex; (2) the concentrated economic base in the Northeast and the consequent presence of large numbers of Russian economic "advisers"; and (3) the Korean War, which forced Kao into contact with high-level Soviet military officials and gave him critical control over large numbers of troops which used the Northeast as their staging area. From his leading position in the Party, military, governmental, and economic (People's Economic Planning Committee) organizations of the region, Kao Kang allegedly formed an "anti-Party" group and later allied this group with Jao Shu-shih when both transferred to major posts in the Central Committee in 1953. The program of this group, according to the official version, aimed to create

> two parties--one, the so-called "Party of the revolutionary bases and the army," the other, the so-called "Party of the white areas..."[9]

Kao allegedly held that "the Party was created by the Army" and "claimed to be the representative of the so-called 'Party of the revolutionary bases and the army' and thus entitled to hold the major authority." In addition to the two ringleaders, seven high-ranking Party members were implicated at the National Conference of the Communist Party in March 1955, and many others of lesser rank were also charged with complicity and purged. All were condemned both for their "evil policies and activities" and for the fact that they attempted to utilize their semi-independent organizational bases and "never put forward any program against the Central Committee of the Party in any Party organization or among the public."[10]

As a consequence of the fight with Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, two major aspects of Party leadership were clarified. These were: (1) the nature of unity in the period of transition to socialism; and (2) the limits on diversity in that period.

1) The nature of unity in the transitional period. The achievement of unity within the Party became the dominant theme in CCP circles after the 1954 Fourth Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee. As stated in the 1954 resolution on Party unity and repeated in the General Program of the 1956 Party Constitution, "solidarity and unity are the very life of the Party, the source of its strength." The new regulations stipulated that leading cadres and members vigilantly watch for signs of disunity and not hesitate to punish and expel those who would flaunt the "precious solidarity." On April 14, 1955, People's Daily set the tone for the subsequent period by urging general Party mobilization against evildoers. In the article ideological reform was made the basis of the prescribed struggle, but the main feature of the reform was to be the strengthening of Party discipline. This new emphasis on rigorous discipline appeared most vigorously in the resolution on unity which stated that the Party members "must conduct relentless struggles and subject them /the evil-doers/ to severe disciplinary measures or even expel them from the Party when necessary." The Party simultaneously reorganized its disciplinary control apparatus and established central and local control commissions to replace the discipline control committees set up in 1949.

Leadership unity was expressed in operational terms under the Leninist slogan "combine collective leadership with individual responsibility," which was officially revived by An Tzu-wen in an important 1954 article in the journal For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy. Two years later, as spelled out by Sung Jen-ch'iung and Teng Hsiao-p'ing at the Eighth Party Congress, collective leadership was hailed in connection with Party unity, but Sung and Teng, as others before them had done, also related it to de-Stalinization and the destruction of the cult of the individual. For these reasons, the Party committees between 1954 and 1956 assumed an organic leadership role in the Government, the military units, and the economy and, under the scrutiny of the control commissions, centralized and coordinated all policy making and policy supervision. To avoid superficial collective leadership, the Party prescribed the holding of periodic, regular meetings and elections which would ensure the vitality of the committees and the participation of the committee members. Under the slogan of collective leadership the Party thus made the terms of the new unity explicit and found a way to effect solidarity and unified direction within the context of organization.

In point of emphasis, therefore, the central organic authority of the Party committee received first priority in the post-1954 campaign to instill ideological and organizational unity. The inability to achieve actual unity during the 1954-57 period, however, forced the CCP leaders to adopt even more stringent measures, particularly ideological rectification, to undergird the authority of the leadership elite. By 1959, the emphasis on "politics in command" under the direction of the Party committees and the first secretaries of the committee had reached a fever pitch. It was in this mood that the Central Committee reinstituted the regional bureaus in 1960 as confirmed in the January 18, 1961 communiqué of the Ninth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee. Problems ranging from outright rebellion to ineffectual or corrupt leadership plagued many provincial or province-controlled areas, and purges had hit major provincial leaders in every part of Communist China. Thus the regions were specifically reestablished to "act for the Central Committee in strengthening leadership over the Party committees in the various provinces"--not to restore autonomy but to ensure conformity.

In general, then, the principal Party reaction to the Kao Kang faction was to enforce and preserve political-organizational unity through discipline. Begun as a reaction to a power faction, the frenetic search for unity on the organizational level quickly spilled over into the area of policy as well. Real or imagined policy differences came under attack in the language of right-left or conservative-radical deviations, and policy decisions were systematically placed in the hands of Party-member cadres. Given these multidimensional reactions, it is highly unlikely that the senior elite would have looked with equanimity on the emergence of groups of Party individuals--particularly within the Central Committee--opposed in any visible way to official policy decisions. "Mobilize the whole party and all people to fight bad men and bad things," People's Daily proclaimed, and any violation of the rules of pre-decision debate or post-decision obedience ("bad things") would probably have been understood as the sure signs of "bad men."[11] Although some purged individuals may have questioned certain applications of the doctrine of "principled struggle" during the period of the "Great Leap Forward," all Party officials publicly agreed that relentless struggle would balance unity and diversity and that it was the key to economic and social development.

The CCP leaders also stubbornly clung to the basic tenet of the doctrine of struggle that the "subjective forces" of personal will and ideological consciousness remained as determinants of all progress. The change in the "objective" factors that supposedly followed the Communist victory in 1949 were placed in a secondary position, and the Party's theorists declared that all objective conditions, particularly the material conditions of economic development, would respond to unified leadership. No material condition could in theory long resist the

manipulation of the united leaderships which had a basic understanding of dialectical materialism. "Beyond all doubt," Teng Hsiao-p'ing reported in 1956, "we could not have led the people and accomplished these complicated tasks in such a short period if there had been no unity in our Party." [12] Although the reasons are far more complex than is suggested here, the Party decisively responded to material barriers to economic development as outlined in the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) by launching an all-out "Great Leap Forward" and commune movement to "unleash the creative capacity of the subjective forces of the masses under the leadership of the Party." These movements sustained the extraordinary preoccupation with inner-Party solidarity.

Also involved in the creation of a united membership after the purge of Kao Kang was the basic distrust of superficial unity. This distrust was one major reason for the renewed stress on collective leadership combined with individual responsibility. Through the collective surveillance of the committee and the rigid discipline imposed by the control commissions, the Party hoped to avoid a duplication of Kao Kang's treachery which had been successfully hidden behind the mask of Communist orthodoxy. One striking point about Kao Kang's challenge to Mao is that he built up his strength with apparent impunity and was not officially exposed until he transferred to Peking in 1953. If Kao "from 1949 on, ...carried on conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing leadership in the Party and state"--and this remains the official, but unproved, version--a major feature of his successful masquerade for almost four years (assuming that Mao was becoming suspicious in 1953) was the magic of his pen.[13] Kao, a native of Shensi and the man who welcomed Mao to Northwest China at the end of the Long March, acquired an important reputation as a writer during the years in which he rose in the Party. By 1951, Kao's articles played a major role in national campaigns, especially the "three anti" campaign. His writings struck at the many evils in the Party and urged cadres to lead the masses in production work and to be models of ideological purity. A typical Kao speech on January 10, 1952--as republished by the People's Publishing House in Peking--appealed to high-level cadres to "conquer the corrosion of bourgeois ideology and oppose rightist trends in the party."[14] The Chinese Communist press called Kao an "ever-correct leader," and he ceaselessly pressed his subordinates to adopt concrete mass line tactics.[15] An assessment of the works written since 1949 by the members of the Seventh and Eighth Central Committees shows that only T'ao Chu can compare to Kao in the energy, quantity, and doctrinaire quality of his writing. Although Mao may have brought Kao to Peking in 1953 in order to curtail his activities in Manchuria, Kao was presented to the CCP membership as a model leader promoted for the purpose of bringing to the central leadership the skills he had displayed in the Northeast.

To bring the discussion of Party unity after Kao up-to-date, the "Military Papers" and other material read for this study do not contain further evidence of disunity within the CCP at the highest levels. On the contrary, the documents seem to reveal a drawing together in the crisis, though a tone of unity would be the most likely one for Party directives and statements sent to the lower levels. Moreover, the Kao-Jao incident as reinforced by the P'eng-Huang purge discussed below has been explicity employed as a deterrent to any potential factions within the central apparatus. Dissatisfied members would see both the damaging effect on the prestige of <u>their</u> Party and a consequent lowering of their collective power within Communist China and the international Communist movement in the Kao-Jao, P'eng-Huang events. All would be likely to reject divisive actions which might lead to their expulsion or which might leave them with a hollow victory if success should destroy the operational effectiveness of the Party. This does not mean that members will not take strong positions within the Party before decisions are rendered, for the taking of strong positions is considered a doctrinal requirement in order to reach the most authoritative decision. As was seen in the analysis of

historical questions, not only are differences in opinion usual, but they are absolutely mandatory if one is to abide by the dogma. This bring the discussion to the problem of diversity.

2) Limits on diversity in the transitional period. The discussion on unity above has already indicated some of the major limits placed on diversity within the Party after the elimination of the Kao-Jao threat. In this section those limits will be summarized and selected Party reactions to the "excessive" diversity practiced by Kao Kang will be examined.

The first clear rule of diversity is that it must be maintained in the open within Party organizations and must support the decisions of the central elite. As ritualized in the dogma of inner-Party struggle, the diverse opinions of "specialists" and of members in charge of particular geographic areas and organizations have to follow the broad outlines set by higher policies and have to be discarded in favor of "more advanced" opinions which are represented by the final decisions of the Party committees. The CCP has fostered a definition of diversity which would maximize participation and local initiative in pursuit of central objectives.

More significant than these doctrinaire limits on membership diversity, however, were the psychological constraints carried over from the Kao-Jao purges. After Kao's "suicide" and the expulsion of the other key members of his "anti-Party" group, an atmosphere of vigilance and suspicion prevailed within the Party. The exact powers of the control commissions were purposely broad and imprecise, and articles on discipline and unity played on the theme of uncertainty and threat. It is unthinkable that during the years between 1955 and 1957, when heavy emphasis fell on Party unity, leading cadres at major conferences--including the Eighth Party Congress in 1956--would have allowed the least opposition to be expressed and it is even less likely that they would have hinted at their own misgivings in public.

None would have risked becoming tainted as members of divisive groups while the memory of Kao Kang's sins was still fresh. To read something concerning factionalism into Communist speeches--even on the policy level--at a time when the tiniest hint of deviation rewarded the errant CCP member with extreme criticism and possible purge is to mistake limited diversity for emergent disunity and to overlook the basic strength of the flexible Party organization. Few are as well trained in reading between the lines as are the Communists, and Party leaders would have blocked potential opponents long before they had surfaced in public view.

As a part of its long-term stress on inner-Party struggle, however, the Party demanded that members continue to speak out in meetings rather than remain mute so as to avoid possible challenge as deviationists. During the National Conference of the Communist Party in 1955, People's Daily attempted to spell out the balance of active but proper struggle in an aritcle entitled "Unprincipled Disputes Must Be Done Away With." Members must not "cover up differences and avoid arguments," the article said. "When arguments are unavoidable," the CCP members must not be afraid of "getting themselves involved."[16] In a similar statement, Teng Hsiao-p'ing said in 1956 that "on matters of day-to-day work, it is permissible, and even unavoidable, that there should be different views among the Party members to some extent."[17] Teng also emphasized "the activity and creative ability of lower organizations" and urged leading cadres to listen sympathetically to the views of their subordinates.[18]

In principle then Party members must engage in debate actively (but "correctly") and put forward views which might later be classified as "conservative" or "radical."

Indeed, it cannot be stressed too much that the ubiquitous theory of contradictions in Mao's China makes all central decisions by definition the "correct" resolution of two erroneous paths. But, assuming that the broad classifications into "conservative" and "radical" roughly approximate positions actually held by individuals, rather than mere jargon, some individuals would "lose" and some "win" on the occasion of each decision. The use of these classifications by Party leaders, however, does not mean that individuals are permitted to persist in opposition after the decision, nor that the content of the classifications is not broad and flexible enough to shift over time. Moreover, adherence to the theory of contradictions would force the "loser" to reevaluate the quality of his thinking, and persistent "losers" would find themselves increasingly liable for radical ideological reform. Presumably, therefore, "winners" and "losers" as well as "conservatives" and "radicals" reverse roles over time. But, can it be assumed that people are as flexible as the doctrine of inner-Party struggle would imply and that in fact, for some, losing does not seem to come all too frequently nor to be personally galling? Certainly, one cannot assume that members who might lose with relative frequency erase their irritation with a simple act of will and thereby become fully reconciled to the new policy positions. Thus it is uncertain how dissatisfactions, long unexpressed, will become revealed in the shifting leadership clusters after Mao's death and in the course of future policy directions. Nevertheless, it is fairly clear that under Mao "losers" in policy debates will receive unceasing indoctrination and scrutiny to deter them from joining forces as an identifiable faction.

The problem of encouraging diversity within prescribed patterns became acute, however, when Party leaders in the 1957-61 period reacted to the criticism of intellectuals and non-communist cadres, to the economic dislocations and production failures of the communes, and to the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. Many CCP documents have detailed the greater need for centralization because of the mistaken behavior of lower-level cadres who, consciously or unconsciously, confused diversity with corrupt practices. Typical examples of cadre venality and malfeasance are enumerated in section IV below and need not be repeated here. These practices seriously impaired the prestige of the cadres among the general population; and the need to restore that prestige and to dispel the views of the Chinese people that cadres are necessarily corrupt and authoritarian is discussed in several documents. In one document, in particular, the extent to which cadres have fallen into disrepute is noted:

> The glory of serving the people as cadres should be verified. To become cadres should not be considered a shameful thing. It should be clearly explained that becoming cadres is quite different from doing bad deeds. [19]

More recently, an article in People's Daily entitled "Strengthen Centralization and Unity, Develop Democracy With the Party" makes clear that the Party must not abandon the diversity and flexibility developed in the revolutionary war even though cadres have used their positions to falsify reports "for the sake of personal fame and profit...and for the sake of personal advancement." [20]

In the years of crisis from 1959 to 1963, the Party blamed "rightists" within its ranks (as well as in the general populace) and purged some members of the Central Committee from leading positions. None was officially purged for the formation of factions, but some were dropped for their alleged reluctance to carry out the policies symbolized in the "three red flags"--the communes, the "Great Leap Forward," and the general line of socialist construction. Members who might have carried their case "to the membership" were denied this opportunity by the postponement of the Ninth Party Congress and by the holding of the 1962 National People's Congress in secret.

The most revealing case of post-1955 deviations occurred in 1959 and is more fully brought to light in the "Military Papers." Those individual party peaders specifically denounced for deviations included P'eng Te-huai, Huang K'o-ch'eng, and Hung Hsüeh-chih. Very little of a direct nature can be learned from these documents about the P'eng-Huang "anti-Party group" since most of the remarks are in the context of what Lin Piao has been doing correctly since P'eng's ouster, not what P'eng did wrong. From the most important documentary comment, however, it appears that P'eng, Huang, and Hung opposed political control of the Army and allowed discipline and morale to deteriorate seriously. The impression is one of a loose organization under P'eng and a much more rigorous operation under Lin. Hung Hsüeh-chih is specifically blamed in this document for corruption and dogmatism in the Army's rear services work, which appears to have been near collapse in 1959.[21] Another document contains the statement that P'eng and Huang represented the "military line of the bourgeoisie"--a line that allegedly was corrected by the critical Military Affairs Committee (MAC) session held from September 14 to October 20, 1960.[22] At this session great stress was placed on the political indoctrination of the military forces.

The "Military Papers" appear to suggest, however, by occasional references to the group as "comrades," that P'eng was treated leniently. Given the nature of present evidence, the P'eng-Huang incident could well have been handled according to the standard formula announced by Mao in 1945 ("Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party") "to treat the illness in order to save the man" and "to clarify our ideas and unite our comrades." Mao then opposed excessive punishment of those who had deviated from the "correct" line but had subsequently repented--a position that was later substantiated by the lenient treatment accorded Party members such as Li Li-san, Ch'en Shao-yü, and others.

If he has confessed his errors, P'eng's career might well be analogous to that of Li Li-san. Li periodically refers to his former sins and in a tone of self-abnegation placed himself at the mercy of the Party. Li's apparent comeback in the North China Bureau may be seen as his success in playing the humble role for the past three decades. Persons such as Li (and perhaps P'eng) who actively and even appreciatively confess gross errors and ideological deviation are hardly the nucleus around which factions may later be built. Their public and Party image is severely distorted, and any activity after their "anti-Party nature" has been exposed makes them liable for admission to the ranks of the enemy. Given the genuine psychological pulls of the belief system, long-time CCP members do not lightly bolt the ranks of the Party for the chance to pursue a dubious career as a hated traitor and an enemy of the people. Thus it would not be surprising for P'eng, Huang, and Hung to be retained on the Central Committee at the Ninth Party Congress (especially should a Congress be held in a period of relative economic success and high cadre morale). To the lower echelons, this action would demonstrate both the strength and the humanity of the central leadership under Mao Tse-tung. For Mao, the retention of P'eng, Huang, and Hung would mean the presence of senior officials who would "enthusiastically" police themselves in order to restore themselves to full status in the apparatus and who would remain grateful to Mao for his "magnanimity."

Measures to establish limits on diversity in the transitional period and to restore discipline, unity, and élan within cadre ranks at all levels receive primary attention in the "Military Papers," and these measures in spirit fully conform to doctrine. For example, within the PLA cadre force, the post-1941 "four course" system (professional, theoretical, cultural, and political education) has been scrapped in favor of the ideologically focused "five combinations." The "five combinations" are: (1) combine the works of Mao Tse-tung with selections from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; (2) combine Mao's writings with the study of policies and directives; (3) combine Mao's writings with research on particular

problems; (4) combine the present situation on the domestic and international fronts with the tasks of building the Army; and (5) combine ordinary and theoretical education.[23] Further, directives now enforce the stabilization of the cadre ranks. Turnover and random transfers receive careful scrutiny and are held to a minimum. The much-discussed "few but essential" policy suggests an even further stress on the quality of the cadres. Leading cadres, of course, exhort their lower levels to participate enthusiastically in various campaigns, and the emphasis falls on training cadres in careful analysis, practical and honest reporting, detailed implementation, constant supervision and reappraisal, and overall simplification of technique. Leaders increasingly demand that cadres follow more elaborate rules and regulations.

As the Party has tightened its discipline and training procedures, however, it has simultaneously opened up other means for the expression of diversity. In a separate study, this writer has mentioned two possible changes which might indicate increased flexibility in selected areas of operation as well as important modifications in the revolutionary doctrine.[24] The first change is the greater freedom from political study granted to technical and scientific cadres, who are no longer required to submit to the previously high norms of indoctrination and control. Although the ninth issue of Red Flag in 1963 called on the Party to "strengthen the political and ideological education of the youth and children," the emphasis continues to fall on more rigid technical standards for Communist China's technical and scientific personnel, a policy which was first outlined in the remarkably casual speech of Ch'en Yi on August 10, 1961.[25] The second change--one which has not yet been fully clarified or proved--is the return to ascriptive and particularistic ties of the traditional village for the placement and advancement of the basic-level cadres of the Party. The Party at the same time, however, has sought to counteract particularistic relationships and nonrevolutionary motives of its personnel in positions above the village level and in 1963 reemphasized an underlying premise in Ch'en Yi's speech that all cadres and Party members would have to attain a minimal level of "political consciousness."

IV. THE CRISIS OF PARTY GENERATIONS AND THE REASSERTION OF DOCTRINE

The obvious diversity within the ranks of the leadership elite cannot meaningfully be equated to factionalism or to serious cleavages. Instead, it has constituted an explicit and approved source of potential strength when kept within the limits of "inner-Party struggle" and the unifying confines of the CCP organizations. Genuine cohesion may have suffered under the threat of purge and other disciplinary measures but study and reform movements, on the other hand, may have channeled or dissipated some individual tensions and discontent. Solidarity may have been threatened during the "Great Leap Forward" debates by the disagreement of strategically located officials--and this is far from certain--but as long as they have chosen to remain within the bounds of Party limits, they have not become a serious threat. The CCP has apparently maintained an average purge rate of less than five percent and has used the selective purge to direct blame away from the party organs and to maximize the educational lessons of failure. [26]

The numerous condemnations of "bourgeois rightists" in the Party, especially after the establishment of the communes, certainly indicates, however, that the Party has prolonged and even reduced to a routine its search for deviation within the ranks of its members in the post-Kao Kang era. At the Eighth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee in August 1959, the Central Committee denounced "the emergence of Right opportunist ideas among some cadres," and three years later at the Tenth Plenum it decided on "the planned interchange of important leading cadres of the Party and government organizations at various levels. It decided to strengthen the work of the Party control commissions at all levels and elected additional members of the Central Control Commission." At the latter plenum, unusual stress was placed on national defense and public security--perhaps because of the decision to attack India--and the Army, the militia, and the public security forces were lauded for protecting public order and standing ready "to smash the aggressive and sabotage activities of any enemy."

The evidence suggests that the concern with opposition among the cadre force and with their incompetence and corruption centered in large measure on the younger generation of Party members and on the lower echelons of the cadre hierarchy. Indeed substantial evidence indicates a tightening of the revolutionary discipline and bonds among the senior and older members in response to international and internal crises and to the assaults from younger CCP members long impatient with revolutionary dreams and the tales of forgotten heroes. Various aspects of this generational problem will be examined in this section.

Although the Party's pronouncements on solidarity have long touched on the tasks of welding old and new members into a united force, the problem of generational disunity did not reach major proportions until the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949. [27] Following its conquest of the mainland, the CCP brought large numbers of youth, especially young workers and intellectuals, into its ranks and thereby precipitated dissatisfaction and antagonism among veteran cadres and CCP members displaced by ambitious youngsters. The reportage on this antagonism--such as the letters concerning the "meritorious veterans" which appeared in the early issues of Study--is relevant but need not be detailed here. The proportion of older to younger members and the needs for both experienced and new cadres were sufficiently great to offset major unrest among the older, but still junior, cadres who might feel "threatened" professionally by the influx of youth. This situation of balance began to change markedly, however, by 1954, when the number of new CCP recruits doubled in comparison to that of the previous year. By

1955, 9,657,000 out of 10,730,000 Party members had joined the Party after 1945, and by 1961 only 20 per cent of the members had Party histories predating 1949.[28]

Teng Hsiao-p'ing signalled the Party's concern with its newer elements at the 1956 Eighth Party Congress, when he said:

> in the past a person's decision to join our Party generally meant that he was prepared to struggle, at the risk of his personal freedom and even his very life, for the interests of the masses...[29]

That was the standard, Teng implied, for "our" generation, but "nowadays, however, it is easy to find people who have joined the Party for the sake of prestige and position." A few months later, Mao Tse-tung, in his famous speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (February 27, 1957, as revised) generalized Teng's comments on the Party youth. He noted a "falling off" in ideological and political work among the youth and the appearance of "unhealthy tendencies." Summing up, he said: "It seems as if Marxism that was once all the rage is not so much in fashion now."[30] Two months later, at the onset of the rectification campaign, the Young Communist League head, Hu Yao-pang, reported the Party's general analysis of the ideological and political lag in the new generation. His analysis is summarized in this paragraph, which remains typical of most analyses of the state of the new generation:

> Promotion of the revolutionary tradition is of speical significance when it is intended to raise the political awakening of the youth. We are emphasizing this question for the reason that the old thoughts still exercise a great influence on the minds of our youths and that youths now around twenty who were only in their early teens on the inauguration of new China have not had much of the dark life of the old society and have never participated in the gruelling class struggle. Our youths are fortunate that they are living in a world which their predecessors have built for them, enjoying the concern of the Party and the love of the society. But they are apt, on that account, to have an erroneous conception. They think that whatever they have is a matter of course and that whatever they do not have, others will arrange for them.

Hu denounced the widespread interest of the new generation in "name, position, and material compensation" and lamented that few were "prepared for a heroic and strenuous struggle."[31]

The Central Committee reacted to these and other deficiencies in the Party by launching the rectification campaign, in April, 1957. Although this campaign to rectify "bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism" has gone through many stages and has touched the lives of Party and non-Party Chinese in various phases and degrees of intensity, this discussion will be focused on that part of the campaign that aimed to remold the new generation of CCP members in the revolutionary image. Obviously, the Central Committee did not single out one segment of the Party for special censure during the campaign because this would have tended to undercut the central rectification theme of reestablishing the solidarity and leadership of the total Party. Nevertheless, many developments after April 1957 point to the increasing concern among the Party leaders for the lack of revolutionary qualities of activism in Party youth. For example, in November 1957, the CCP directed that all students in the middle-school and higher-level grades study a specific, prescribed curriculum of Communist works selected in the main from those written by Chinese

Communists in the revolutionary period. More significantly, Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in his important report to the September 1957 Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee on the rectification campaign, described the "serious ideological problems" which existed in the ranks of the Party and stated that these problems had "social and ideological origins." In examining these origins, he noted in particular that most CCP members had come from nonproletarian families, that most had been admitted hurriedly and without adequate preparation or sufficient attention to qualifications, and that

> what is more important is that the great majority of the Party members joined the Party in the days after our Party had won nation-wide victory.[32]

Four years later at the 40th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the CCP, Liu Shao-ch'i pressed the same theme concerning the backwardness of the new members and suggested that the Party then anticipated that the problem would become increasingly acute. He stated that 70 per cent of the then more than 17,000,000 members had joined the CCP since 1953 and lacked experience. He specifically contrasted them to the older generation of members who "have gone through sanguinary revolutionary struggles and are now the backbone of our Party." These latter, he added, did not yet have "adequate experience in socialist construction."[33]

The issues of Work Correspondence, the "Military Papers" mentioned earlier, provide ample justification for the Party's anxieties concerning the new generation. For convenience, an examination of the material contained in these papers may be divided into analyses of policies toward the Army, the militia, the intellectuals, and the lower cadres.

(1) The Army. The Party's policies toward the Army during the period 1960-61 appear on balance to be directed toward lower-level cadres and young soldiers. The tone of crisis of the "Military Papers" is set by the realization of extreme disaffection in the military, including the militia. In one significant document--one of the few explicitly receiving comment by Mao Tse-tung--Mao via Lin Piao orders Lo Jui-ch'ing to investigate the conditions reported by a study in which a soldier is quoted as having said: "'When I am demobilized I'll ask only for a gun.' The other person asked him: 'What do you want a gun for?' He replied: 'To fight the Party.'"[34] The central "management and education" campaign in 1961 and a campaign against the "five styles" also aimed to correct cadre excesses in the Army and to alleviate discontent brought on by frozen enlistments, low salaries, and reports of catastrophes in the home towns of the troops. Moreover, the Party expected no magical transformation of existing conditons despite compaigns to improve Party control of the Army. For example, in December 1960, the Party stated: "Political incidents and cases in units have increased recently. Marshal Lin has reminded us that these cases may increase in the first six months next year."[35] Such hardheaded appraisals are reinforced by frequent warnings against over-optimism or against looking at the "nine good fingers" and ignoring "the one bad finger."

(2) The militia. Party disappointment regarding its militia programs constitutes a major point of verification in the "Military Papers." Party policies do not merely dictate holding the line in the case of the militia, but go so far as to suggest that placing weapons in unreliable hands touched off major uprisings in various locations--particularly in Honan. It is stated in a Military Affairs Committee (MAC) directive of January 7, 1961, for example: "Attention must be paid to the purity of militia components and militiamen must be placed under the leadership of very reliable cadres who are Party members. Weapons must be put into the hands of only those militiamen who can be trusted."[36] Only at the end of the Work Correspondence series, in material issued in the late summer of 1961, does the sense of desperation concerning the militia ease. Party policies in the

period require the militia to maintain social order and to guard against the resurgence of "counterrevolutionaries," but with the use of "weapons only against the enemy not the people."[37] It is stated in a January 1961 MAC report that the militia had become a kind of monster for the Party in 1959-60. The people, the report states, call militiamen "rabid dogs," "whippers," and "a group of tigers," and it is said that the conduct of the militiamen "has seriously impaired the relationship between the Party and the people and completely ruined the reputation of the militiamen themselves."[38]

(3) The intellectuals. As in the cases of the Army and the militia, the major blame for the chaotic conditions existing among the intellectuals fell on the lower levels, and the Party's policies toward the intellectuals suggested extensive moderation to alleviate the near disaster of 1961. In a document that fully coincides with the published Ch'en Yi speech of August 10, 1961, referred to above, the Party reiterates the shift in interpreting the "red and expert" slogan of 1957.[39] According to that slogan all cadres were required to concentrate fully on both technical and political subjects. The present emphasis is to separate training into two fairly exclusive compartments. According to the shift in the summer of 1961, technical specialists need only minimal political consciousness, while the political elite is not required to be as familiar with technical matters as formerly. An August 1961 report of the PLA General Rear Services Department on the present and future status of upper-grade intellectuals states: "We have made too high and too fast a demand on their /the higher intellectuals'/ ideological reconstruction."[40] The report further declares that a lenient and patronizing policy toward the intellectuals will be followed in the immediate future, a statement which suggests a return to the policy inaugurated by Chou En-lai's "Report on the Question of Intellectuals" in January 1956. For the political elite, on the other hand, even more intensive indoctrination has been employed, and sensitive (security and confidential) work has passed out of the hands of non-Party intellectuals.[41]

(4) The lower cadres. Although the numerous references in Work Correspondence to the Army, the militia, and the intellectuals apply to lower-level cadres, the general cadre problem above and beyond specific organizations is examined in other material. In the overview, the "Military Papers" give a picture of extreme disorganization and lassitude in the organizational life of the CCP even when reinforced by the presumed military discipline of PLA units. Frequent references in the documents denounce cadres for failure to go to the lower levels as specified in the 1957 and later hsia fang directives. According to MAC reports, cadres make continuous, fundamental mistakes in style and method and from the Party's viewpoint have lost respect. They and their wives are belittled for self-indulgence. Corruption seems to flourish, and unending calls for discipline go unheeded. Laziness, conservatism, indolence, indifference, and cruel vindictiveness constitute the prevailing image of the cadre.[42] Cadres sent to the Army ranks are a source of friction rather than a model inspiration, and local Party cadres appear to conflict frequently with PLA cadres in the same geographical area. Various documents stress the importance of building Party branches properly and of bringing CCP and Young Communist League members into all PLA units in order to cope with such poor cadre methods as the holding of incorrect struggle meetings, the use of false accusations, the application of rough techniques in education, the lack of concern for the sick, and the punishment of alleged offenses without investigation.

Between 1957 and 1963, the CCP leadership elite attempted to instill revolutionary traditions and habits by drawing on a vast inventory of techniques and appeals. Again the "Military Papers" provide key insights. These documents reveal a heavy concentration on ideological and political reform for all groups in Communist China, but with special emphasis on the four groups noted above. Lin Piao's contribution to recent policy emphasizes political indoctrination, programs

publicized by slogans, and a more charged political atmosphere. This contribution can be most clearly seen in the anti "five styles" campaign, the "two recollections and three investigations" movement, and the "three-eight style." The "five styles" (wu feng) are: (1) the (excessive) Communist style; (2) the boasting style; (3) the commandist style; (4) the special (priviliges for) cadres style; and (5) the blind (promotion of) production style. The "two recollections and three investigations" constitute a hate campaign to recollect the suffering of the working class and Chinese nation and to investigate the individual's standpoint (li-ch'ang), will to fight, and work performance. The "three-eight style" refers to three sentences and eight characters which are translated as follows:

> Determination of a firm and correct political direction, a working style of hard work and plain living, and skillful and flexible tactics and strategy; and unity, tension, seriousness, and liveliness.

Efforts were made in these ideological campaigns to force a favorable comparison for the Communist-controlled period over the Kuomintang period. Anti-Americanism and intense nationalism appear at times to bolster the "common Chineseness" of the current struggle.

As directed at newer CCP members and cadres, the high level of exhortation continued as one campaign phased into the next over the years. Monuments were erected to the Party's martyrs, and hack writers ground out their tales of revolutionary glories and the nostalgic reminiscences of the great struggle. Children were led to revolutionary museums and challenged to write essays on how they had been "born in bitterness but raised in sweetness." Revolutionary cadres urged younsters to compare the old and the new and to recall Mao Tse-tung's words that "quite a number of young people cannot make a proper comparison between the old and the new China. It is not easy for them to comprehend thoroughly what hardships the people of our country went through."[43] Despite the increased emphasis on achievement standards for technical and scientific personnel, the Party still expected young people, especially potential Party members, to adopt minimal ideological standards and to abide by the Party's decisions for their lives without complaint.

Two outstanding examples of the senior generation's attempt to instill the revolutionary spirit in the post-1949 Party recruits came in late 1962 and early 1963. The first was the highly publicized issuance of the revised edition, in Chinese only, of Liu Shao-ch'i's How to Be a Good Communist (literally, On the Cultivation of the Communist Party Member). Published on August 1, 1962, Liu's revised 1939 essay stressed more forcibly than had the original the revolutionary traditions of the Party and the key importance of dedicated struggle and selfless commitment in the "cultivation" of a Communist. The very way in which the Party released and promulgated the essay suggests that the Party leaders were attempting to convince the lower-level members and themselves that despite many concessions the revolution must go on and the role of the revolutionary Party must increase.

The second example of the attempt to ignite the revolutionary fire among younger Communists explicitly centered on new Chinese youth and used a deceased member of the younger generation, Lei Feng, to symbolize the role that revolutionary struggle should play in the lives of that generation. Lei was born in 1940 and had suffered unusual maltreatment at the hands of the Japanese and the Kuomintang-led "classes." In 1949, he watched with glee when the Party executed the landlord responsible for the death of his mother and, thus stirred, became a young activist He thrilled to the stories of Communist heroes and dutifully turned his hatred against the United States. Emotionally he identified himself wholeheartedly with

the older generation and exerted untiring effort through work and study to emulate the martyrs of that generation. Although taunted by others for acting like a fool, he persisted in his efforts to become a model activist until late 1962, when he was killed in a routine accident. The Central Committee extracted this moral from Lei's life of dedication: A common youth can find great adventure in the present drive for socialist construction, and his "revolutionary" effort makes a real difference in that drive. On the basis of this moral, the Party launched a nationwide campaign to "learn from Lei Feng" in the spring of 1963.

An impressive body of evidence, some of which has been summarized and analyzed in the various sections of this study, thus indicates that the Party leaders perceive the most serious cleavage in the Party ranks in terms of "our" pre-1949 revolutionary generation and "your" post-1949 generation. It is possible to conclued from this evidence that the leadership elite now considers the question of kindling the revolutionary spirit within the new generation as the central task which it faces. On such kindling depends the fate of mass line leadership and thus the fate of the Party's relationship with the Chinese population. Many documents examined in the preparation of this study clearly show that the close wartime relationship between the Party and the masses has seriously deteriorated and in many places has been flagrantly replaced by arrogant command and fickle dictatorship. This has happened at a time of serious economic crisis when the Party can least afford disaffection among the population because of the leadership practices of its lower cadres. Drastic measures have thus been taken to curtail corruption and "anti-communist" practices within the cadre force and, as mentioned in the previous section, to make some concessions to peasant parochialism.

The rising tensions between the two generations of Party members have particularly clouded the problem of succession to the Maoist leadership. Eighty per cent of the regular members of the Central Committee are over fifty years of age, and most of the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau are in their sixties or seventies. In his study, "The 'Next Generation' of Chinese Communist Leaders," Donald Klein has graphically illustrated the extent to which the Mao-led elite is aging.[44] Bringing figures up to date, the ages of the 18 full members of the Political Bureau average 64 years and those of the six alternates average 60 years. Of the hard core Central Committeemen elected at the 1945 Seventh Party Congress, the average age is 68 years, although the average age of the group of alternate Central Committeemen from 1945, which includes such luminaries as Ch'en Po-ta, Lo Jui-ch'ing, Liao Ch'eng-chih, and Ulanfu, is 58 years. Moreover, many elected to the Eighth Central Committee de novo in 1956 identify completely with the Maoist leadership policies and bring long Party records of service to the senior elite. Indeed, as noted by Klein, this group includes two members of the Political Bureau (K'o Ch'ing-shih and Li Ching-ch'üan) plus An Tzu-wen, Liu Ning-i, Li Hsüeh-feng, and Yang Shang-k'un, all major figures in the Maoist image. This latter group also averages 58 years of age.

These statistics suggest that, though the deaths of Mao, Liu, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai could come in a rapid sequence, a group fully identified with the revolutionary group and its strategies and techniques could carry on for at least another ten to fifteen years. Of the original 4.5 million "pre-liberation" Party members in 1949, approximately 3.4 million were in the Party in 1961, and the presumption has been that they fill the majority of the more than 300,000 cadre posts in the Party at the hsien level and above as well as most of the equivalent posts in the governmental, military, and economic apparatus. The exact successors to Mao's inner circle in the present Political Bureau would, of course, determine the specific nature of future policy directions, but it is difficult to see the occurrence of a sharp break in the revolutionary traditions of that inner circle within the next five to ten years.

Although the senior elite must award an increasingly higher percentage of the more authoritative posts to the "post-liberation" members, a substantial revolution at the top is not likely for many years to come. Nevertheless, a generational split with its lower and middle ranks poses ever-greater difficulties for the central leadership and has been identified as a key problem. As it faces its declining years, the elite has intensified the tempo of exhortation and has attempted to pass on lessons of the 1927-1949 years to remold the thinking of those who lack "training in actual struggles, lack knowledge, including the knowledge of class struggle, and lack the ability of discerning the correct direction."45 Thus CCP officials have accepted the challenge of sparking the Chinese youth and have adopted tactics of rectification and study and the incentives of promotion and recognition to encourage newer members to adopt their perspectives on the revolutionary struggle.

These tactics and incentives have not yet been effective, however, nor have they been viewed in isolation by the new generation of cadres and CCP members. Ch'en Yi's fundamental modifications of the "red and expert" policies in 1961 in favor of achievement standards for technical and scientific cadres have probably further separated political cadres from the scientific-technical programs of development at the same time that village cadres are being drawn from the more traditional sectors of village life. Rewards for production and technical achievements would tend to undermine the purely political and ideological appeals. Hence contradictory policies affect the motives of the post-1949 generation and thereby tend to undercut programs for instilling revolutionary zeal. The elite wants to modernize Communist China yet keep it revolutionary. The past and the future vie for pre-eminence, and the CCP leadership constantly shifts in order to select the best of both. But it has also responded to the tugs of village traditionalism and industrial rationalism, and the image of the best of all possible worlds has become increasingly complicated.

V. THE CENTRAL ELITE AND THE PLACE OF MAO TSE-TUNG

The evidence concerning high-level dissension on matters of policy examined in the earlier sections of this study did not, on balance, substantiate the presence of factional groupings within the senior elite, but, on the contrary, seemed to point to more cohesive relationships at the central level in the aftermath of the Kao-Jao and P'eng-Huang purges and in response to domestic and international setbacks which have occurred since 1959. To repeat, however, this evidence has not disproved the possible presence of factions, although it has seriously undermined the conclusion that factions in fact exist and has indicated alternative directions taken by inner-Party tensions. Similarly, the evidence concerning the position of individual Party leaders within the apparatus is suggestive but not in all cases conclusive. In general, the picture of a leadership preoccupied with the unity of the lower echelons, rather than its own unity, prevails, though on several occasions the Party has taken pains to symbolize overall unity through directives concerning the proper posting of the pictures of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (in the well-known order of Mao, Liu, Chou, Chu, Ch'en, Lin, and Teng). 46

In the materials read considerable attention is paid to the role of Mao Tse-tung. This role is vital to an understanding of the central leadership. As seen in the documents, Mao's charismatic, authoritative role outweighs and sets the context for the personal power that he exercises. Made to stand for a united Chinese Communist political Party, Mao serves to strengthen all central leaders and the overall image and effectiveness of the CCP. Moreover, it is said that Mao has a "world position" and that his writings have a world wide significance. The military weakness of Communist China forces its leaders to emphasize their strength in the political rather than the military-economic arena, and Mao's works serve as the transmission medium for Chinese Communist political doctrine. In one context, the Party states: "Although the material atomic bomb is important, the spiritual atomic bomb is more important. It is the spiritual atomic bomb that we have the monopoly of. No imperialist or reactionary can compete with us in this respect." 48 That Mao represents the Party's "vehicle" to penetrate the thinking of the Chinese -- and the world's -- peoples is suggested in the statement of the late Lo Jung-huan that "Mao's teachings [serve] as a model example" and that "the world's revolutionary movement must depend on the thinking of Mao Tse-tung" in order to oppose revisionism. 49 Lo adds: "The fourth volume of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung is the best weapon against revisionism." In the world struggle where "the whole world is studying the writings of Mao Tse-tung," Mao -- not Khrushchev, who is not mentioned -- stands in the natural sequence of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. Mao remains, therefore, a dominant rallying symbol as well as a powerful leader, and his international role continues to be vital for maintaining Communist China's current international posture and for sustaining critical advantages for Communist China in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The only other individual leader requiring particular comment is Lin Piao. Lin emerges from the "Military Papers" as an active, versatile leader. Certain aspects of the documents -- such as the use of "chief" (tsung) Lin and the flattering mention of "Chief Lin's leadership thought" (Lin tsung ti chih-tao szu-hsiang) are puzzling and suggest that for special military purposes Lin may

be playing something of the symbolic role that Mao plays for more general matters. 50 Lin's playing this role would be required because of the serious nature of military disorganization in the period since the "Great Leap Forward." The fact that Lin and Mao have been reported to be seriously ill in the past may also have bolstered their charismatic function, since illness presumably would reduce their long-term "threat" in pure power terms. Crudely put, it is easier to extol a man who is about to die.

Although some interpretative sources have judged Lin to be "dogmatic," he does not appear significantly more dogmatic than others of the elite and in fact has emphasized many of the more "democratic" features inherent in the mass line. He has, for example, urged better treatment of troops, better working conditions, faster promotions for the qualified, and more active participation by the lower echelons of the PLA. The emphasis on discipline in some of his pronouncements would follow from the nature of the chaotic military environment which he inherited.

VI. TENSIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The first seven months of 1963 brought into full focus the Chinese Communist attitudes on international relations and revealed more fully than ever before the intensity of Chinese bitterness toward the Soviet Union. Insulted and rebuked at major Communist meetings in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself, Chinese Communist leaders publicly expounded their opposition to the Russian "general line of peaceful coexistence."

Although an examination of international questions might appear to fall outside the scope of a paper on inner-Party tensions, in fact the crisis in Communist China's international position has tended to reduce internal friction at the highest CCP levels and to limit other tensions within the country as all Chinese respond to common emotions of nationalism and xenophobia.

In key documents in Work Correspondence Communist China's present position in the world is assessed and the strategies which flow from that position are enumerated. These strategies may be conviently analyzed under four headings: (1) general principles; (2) policies toward the United States; (3) policies toward the non-communist, uncommitted countries; and (4) policies toward the communist bloc. An analysis of these strategies, which are fully affirmed by the official 1963 statements, will help indicate the degree to which Party leaders are willing to commit themselves to an independently conceived strategy and thus the degree to which they feel they can rely on the unity of their membership and the support of the people of Communist China.

1) General principles. It is stated in the key document on this topic that no important world problems can be settled (or have been settled) without Chinese participation. "On the other hand," the document continues, "we must also realize that world problems cannot be settled by big countries alone, even with Chinese participation." Noting that three methods exist to resolve world difficulties -- spheres of influence, peaceful coexistence, and protracted struggle waged by the Communist bloc -- the document stresses the validity of the third approach alone. The key element in the waging of an effective struggle allegedly rests on communist solidarity, which in turn rests on Communist China's domestic strength. The burden of the argument is focused on the requirement of Chinese power and initiative "instead of relying on the good will of others." Our "international prestige" the document asserts, "depends on our continuous efforts." Further emphasis falls on the need for tactical flexibility which dictates in part that China not be "restricted" by well-meaning neutrals or "fall into the trap of the UN." [51]

2) Policies toward the United States. As Communist China's "major enemy" in the world, the United States sets the stage for all other policies. The present anti-American struggle is compared at one point in the "Military Papers" to "a game of chess" in which "one bad move will cause the loss of the game" -- indicating a continued cautious strategy when the papers were written in 1961. Taiwan, moreover, stands as the central pawn in this game. The nature of the world contest is described as a "ping-pong game" in which the Chinese "either win the world championship" or come in second, and an argument is put forth for a "championship" strategy. [52]

The details of the strategy vis-à-vis the United States are spelled out in

an April 1961 document. The principle of the present (1961) strategy is stalemate with the United States and struggle for the uncommitted countries. In essence, the same strategy reappears in 1963 in the twenty-five point letter of the CCP Central Committee on the "general line" for international relations. The 1961 document states: "It is better to keep Sino-American relations frozen and stalemated for many years. All differences must be settled at the same time, if a settlement is expected; that is, the U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, formal recognition of new China, the exchange of reporters, and so on must be settled together." In the contest with the United States, the Chinese Communists exhibit the feeling of having to "stand up" to the United States and to maintain a sharp edge on the dispute. Any attempts to compromise -- particularly in the direction of two Chinas -- presumably blunt this sharp edge. "U.S. imperialism is testing our determination in opposing imperialism to find out if we would bow before pressure," it is stated in the document. "Being a new socialist country if China gives in, letting the imperialist armies take away her territory our international prestige would drop 10,000 feet." [53] Thus, the Chinese Communists expect to stand firm toward the United States and do not expect to see significant changes in Sino-American relations.

In the Chinese Communist view, India, the UAR, Ghana, Yugoslavia, and "other rightists in Asian and African countries" (particularly American allies) are aligned with U.S. policies. [54] The statement is made: "Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, Hassan, Toure, Bourguiba, and Abbas have their own idea on doing things. In short, everyone is selling his own merchandise." [55] It is asserted in the documents that the center of the anti-American struggle is in Africa, with Laos and Vietnam running a close second. The strident anti-Indian tone of the documents reveals the frustration which the Chinese Communists then felt over trends in South Asian developments, which, of course, they sought to change with their invasion of the Indian frontier in October 1962. One may speculate in the light of their obvious reluctance to engage India in 1961 that rather extraordinary pressures and opportunities must have been present to compel them to strike the following year. [56]

3) Policy toward the uncommitted countries. As stated in the previous section, Mao Tse-tung's thought is considered the major weapon in penetrating uncommitted countries. "At present, the whole world is studying the writings of Mao Tse-tung," it is stated in one document. "Latin America, Japan, and Africa are studying the writings of Mao Tse-tung. Many party cadres of the Communist Party of Argentina have copies of the works of Chairman Mao. The revolution in Cuba was carried out on the basis of the 16 key words on guerrilla warfare by Chairman Mao." It is added that "the parties in countries which are striving for national liberation all say that China is the leader in the movement for national liberation." [57] With Africa as the key area, the current strategy supported by "Mao's writings" is "to oppose imperialism and colonialism, emphasizing national revolutions and broad united fronts." [58] For this strategy, the history of the CCP is taken as the foremost model. After the independence of the new countries has been achieved, the strategy shifts to reliance on the national experience of each country and the establishment of economic self-sufficiency ("not relying on foreign aid"). Sensing the bandwagon effect of revolutionary movements, the focus is on key target areas. It is stated in one report: "it would be a great influence if one or two of the independent African countries could really accomplish the national revolution by carrying out the task of anti-imperialism and the internal democratic revolution. When the opportunity is ripe, the wave of revolution will roll up the continent of Africa like a mat so that more than 200 million Africans will become world leaders. We must not be short-sighted on this question." [59]

4) Policies toward the communist bloc. Much of the foregoing constitutes the proper context in which to analyze Sino-Soviet relations. Abiding by doctrine, the documents stress the continued importance of bloc solidarity, and several documents suggest significant Chinese Communist reliance in 1961 on the Soviet Union in some (particularly economic-technical) fields. Nonetheless, the Chinese Communists remain committed to their own interpretations of doctrine and to their self-proclaimed status as the "foremost model" for the national revolutionary movement. In one report it is lamented that "some of our friends do not quite understand us, but we must be patient with them," language used again during the July 1963 Sino-Soviet talks, and that some people "among our friends" belittle Chinese Communist economic programs and exaggerate Communist China's economic difficulties. 60 As stated above, the Chinese Communists laud self-reliance almost on principle and make clear that disagreement with the Soviet Union is a natural phenomenon in Communist relations. In the above-cited document, for example, it is stated: "Because of differing conditions, China and the Soviet Union cannot possibly agree completely on every problem" though allegedly Sino-Soviet agreement then existed on "disarmament, Laos, Cuba, the Congo, and the Kennedy Administration." Despite this announced agreement, however, it is added, "the Soviet Union cannot adopt our policy toward the United States, nor can we adopt Soviet policy toward the United States."

An undertone of bitterness toward the Soviet Union in the "Military Papers" is difficult to document with specific references. Discussions of lack of economic assistance, of poor domestic equipment which the Soviet Union could supply, and of Mao's exalted role imply deep-rooted antagonism. The burden of the argument concerning Communist China's prestige as dependent on domestic production substantiates the view that the Chinese Communists have been extremely sensitive to Soviet criticism of Chinese economic backwardness. Moreover, the point is made in one document that Communist China ("all brotherly parties") should be given an equal voice in international Communist conferences -- a point hardly worth making if Communist China had been given such an equal voice. 61 One unexplained slip of the pen in the documents also reveals the possible extent of the hostility of the Chinese Communists toward the Soviet Union: "Tranquility and safety of our country's southwestern and northwestern [that is, Soviet] frontiers must continue to be preserved...." 62

The documents suggest no Soviet assistance in case of war. The Chinese Communists do not appear to expect an immediate conflict with the United States but neither do they rule out the possibility of a suprise attack by American military forces. The fear of sudden moves by the United States presumably prompted a tightening of confidential and security work in 1961, for example. The Work Correspondence series highlights the Chinese Communist dread of nuclear and bacterial warfare on the one hand and the hope of attaining advanced weapons and technical expertise on the other. 63 In several documents a shift in military training programs to prepare for scientific and technological advances in the coming few years is noted, but in the meantime the Chinese Communists have adopted a passive strategy of dispersal in order to survice nuclear attack and thence to wage "close combat" with invading ground forces. 64 Maintenance of internal communications after nuclear attack has become a primary mission of radio and signal personnel. Party leadership at the branch level and effective political indoctrination of cadres remain the principal techniques to prepare for and coordinate the passive defense, to strengthen Communist China's ability to react to international crises successfully, and to transform the present backward technological level of the country.

The exact effect of international politics on domestic tensions is unclear. Although the Chinese Communists would probably react in unison to the Soviet moves against Communist China and its spokesmen since 1962 and to the

"conservative and revisionist" Soviet line of "peaceful coexistence," many of the Soviet Union's policies toward Communist China and some of its acts against the Chinese Communists -- such as those following the unauthorized distribution of the June 1963 Central Committee letter by the Chinese Communists -- have been brought on by provocative statements or acts initiated by the Chinese Communists. Thus some Chinese responsible for China's economic development or otherwise attuned to Soviet friendship might well place the blame on their own leaders for the present rift with the Soviet Union. A general sense of uncertainty and anxiety pervades those sections of the "Military Papers" which deal with international relations and runs sharply counter to the sense of direction and correctness which supposedly comes to those who adhere to doctrine. In the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the 1962-63 Indian crisis, however, it seems fair to conclude that international events place severe strictures on the improper expression of domestic tensions even though those events might seriously exacerbate the tensions.

VII. UNITY AND CONFLICT: THE DILEMMA OF THE MIDDLE LEVEL

The balance of unity and diversity has historical roots and was maintained by the self-discipline and dedication developed in ideological remolding sessions and sustained by the wartime emergency as supplemented by organizational discipline. The Party assumed that a high degree of ideological and political consensus would permit the encouragement of local autonomy and flexibility and that this flexibility would give the CCP critical advantages in the revolutionary war. It also stipulated that the balance of rigidity and flexibility need not depend on war and that contrived forms of struggle would be sufficient during peacetime to maintain active participation in accordance with elite prescriptions.

In the transition after the 1949 victory, these assumptions and statements were challenged on many levels. First, older cadres reacted unfavorably to the influx of "raw youth," and in time a great majority of the Party members raised in the revolutionary war came to have a sense of separate identity. Without a previously-elaborated set of long-range goals and lacking technical and scientific skills, many in the Party elite felt insecure and became more militantly attached to their wartime habits, values, and techniques. Second, the zeal and commitment implied in these habits and values set the revolutionary generation apart from the young recruits on precisely those grounds which the youth did not and could not share. Thus the two groups increasingly challenged each other's standards and thereby further widened the gulf between themselves. The crises in domestic and international policies in all likelihood have confirmed both sides in their positions and intensified their antagonism: the youth see the failure of policy and the older generation see the failure of implementation. Third, the growing rift between the old and new generations occurred during a period in which the diversity of the Party structure was being utilized by Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih to undermine the Maoist leadership. The CCP elite had always encouraged diversity and flexibility in order to strengthen its mass appeal and local adaptability but had simultaneously worked to thwart factions and the growth of family-like attitudes. The violation of the rules of inner-Party struggle by Kao-Jao "anti-Party group" provoked the elite to reemphasize disciplinary controls and to state the bases of unity and struggle in the most explicit terms. The more intensive use of discipline antagonized newer members who were then flooding into the Party branches and who were also under attack for their lack of revolutionary fervor and selfless commitment. Their reaction was to shun active political study and ideological debate and formally to abide by the minimum rules required to advance themselves in the apparatus. This passive strategy, of course, further convinced the elite that its potential heirs did not yet merit the mantle of leadership, and this conviction was strengthened after the exposure of corrupt and arbitrary cadre practices in 1959-60. And, fourth, these reactions of the youth threatened the interpretation of struggle in a period of uneasiness among the older generation concerning the validity of its beliefs and experiences. Psychologically, this had the effect of forcing the revolutionary group to take even more drastic steps of indoctrination and control as a means to justify and support its beliefs. These steps were thus partially irrational as well as inconsistent with the policies for bolstering technical personnel and village-level cadres.

This partial summary of the findings of this study highlights the complexities involved in the strains on Chinese Communist Party leadership since 1949 and related these complexities to the problems of Party generations and elite succession. Organizationally, the net result of these complex strains and problems has been the strengthening of the Party committees and the role of the Party secretaries, the establishment of more rigid controls on diversity within the Party, and the retrenchment of "unqualified" and "superfluous" cadres and functionaries under the so-called hsia fang policy. These organizational developments coincided, however, with the maturing of the "generational split" and were immensely complicated by internal and international crises. For analytical purposes, these complexities may be broken down as follows, although in fact all aspects were mutually reinforcing and interoperative: (1) the revolutionary generation staffs and controls the highest echelons above the hsien (county)-level structures while the new generation similarly staffs and controls local structures at the hsien level and below; (2) purges of responsible cadres have struck primarily at the provincial levels and below, and modifications in leadership doctrine have been felt primarily at the local levels; (3) these differentials in generational responsibilities, liabilities, and adjustments have tended to create a cohesiveness and common identity at the highest and lowest levels of the Party, although these two identities are largely antithetical and based on grounds which cannot be eliminated or ignored; and (4) these same responsibilities, liabilities, and adjustments have tended to confuse cohesion and identity at the hsien, special district, and provincial levels (or the equivalent), which are the levels most likely to provide successors to the senior elite in the future.

The coincidence of Party age (the length of time an individual has spent in the Party), common experiences, high insecurity, and official censure has helped cause a growing sense of common identity and cohesiveness among the new generation members who bear the major burdens of village-level leadership and thus the ultimate responsibility for the implementation of policy. The Central Committee has, however, traditionally depended on this lowest level for the successful functioning of the mass line and relies heavily on the local-level cadres to complete policy tasks and mobilize and indoctrinate the populace. So vital is the lower-level cadre in the political process that the Party has made important concessions to him, particularly to the village cadres and the technical-scientific cadres, and these concessions, which may be inconsistent with the programs of intensive ideological remolding and political control, have even further separated the highest and lowest levels from each other.

At the hsien, special district, and provincial levels, however, there is no such coincidence of Party age, experiences, level of responsibility, security, and official attitude. Moreover, the middle levels of the apparatus are in a "doctrinal void." Party writers have elaborated the doctrine for the highest and lowest cadres -- the Party center and the Party branch -- but have remained surprisingly mute on those in between. As mentioned in the earlier sections of this study, the recent plenums of the Central Committee and numerous official statements have singled out the middle levels for intensive criticism, and in 1960-61, the Central Committee established the regional bureaus to supervise the performance of the provinces. In the years of rectification and during the intensive phases of the hsia-fang and anti-rightist campaigns, the major onus fell on cadres of the hsien, special district, and province. Between 1958 and 1961 at least eight secretaries at the provincial level who were concurrently members of the Central Committee (Liu Ko-p'ing, Shu T'ung, Wu Chih-p'u, Chang Chung-liang, Chao Chien-min, Chou Hsiao-chou, Li T'ao, and P'an Fu-sheng) were

purged or demoted for alleged failures in their provinces, and similar purges fell on hsien and special district cadres. Although these campaigns and purges also extended to the lowest levels, at those levels the threats and uncertainties of censure would reinforce pre-existing attitudes concerning lack of status and security. At the middle levels, on the other hand, these threats and uncertainties would often run directly counter to the attitudes of status and security and thus distort the identity and cohesion in this group.

Three hypotheses related to the middle levels of the Chinese Communist Party are beyond the scope of this study but deserve further exploration. These are:

1. Party members of the revolutionary generation at the middle levels (who are in the great majority, as indicated above) wish to identify with the highest echelons, among whom they number their wartime colleagues. Threats, criticism, and controls imposed from above on these members have intensified personal tensions which are reflected in the combination of rigid doctrinairism and revolutionary sentimentality in their writings. Some in this group may respond to the tensions by abandoning their revolutionary fervor and withdrawing from the struggle.

2. Party members of the new generation at the middle levels (whose numbers are at present small) cannot or do not wish to identify with either the highest or lowest echelons. These members lack a central model for their actions and disdain their contemporaries from the revolutionary generation, who, they feel, are less qualified and are merely masking their deficiencies by their displays of revolutionary doctrinairism and sentimentality. They would respond to tensions as a normal part of the risks and are apt to be more ambitious and professional in their motives. Lacking a model to measure and guide their behavior, these members will tend to be idiosyncratic in their actions and to display a high degree of opportunism or entrepreneurship.

3. The highest elite will view both these types of members at the middle level as unsatisfactory heirs. It will search for the few old and new generation cadres who meet both the revolutionary and performance qualifications and thus will increase the uncertainty among the middle group concerning selection and promotion.

These are only hypotheses, and they must be tested over a period of time. Presumably the Ninth Party Congress (which is still unscheduled) will provide important clues to the problems at the middle level. Moreover, as formulated, these hypotheses draw heavily on data and conclusions in the social sciences derived from Western experiences (for example, the generational problem in Israel). Thus they will have to be much more rigorously refined to become applicable to the Chinese Communist case.

NOTES

1. Copies of the Kung Tso T'ung Hsün (hereafter cited as K.T.T.H.), in the Chinese language, are available from the Library of Congress. The documents are referred to in this study as either the "Military Papers" or Work Correspondence.

2. Studies of factions include: Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), chap. ii; and Roderick MacFarquhar, "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," Pacific Affairs, December 1958, pp. 323-335. A study of the "right-left" groupings in which the term "faction" is avoided is: Communist China 1955-1959 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

3. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), Vol. II, p. 272.

4. Ibid., p. 203.

5. K.T.T.H., No. 22, June 1, 1961.

6. K.T.T.H., No. 26, July 13, 1961.

7. Mao, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 20.

8. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), Vol. IV, p. 374.

9. Documents of the National Conference of the Communist Party of China March 1955 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), p. 14.

10. Ibid., p. 16.

11. Jen Min Jih Pao, April 14, 1955.

12. Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), Vol. I, p.202.

13. Documents of the National Conference of the Communist Party of China March 1955 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), p. 13.

14. Kao Kang, K'o Fu Tzu Ch'an Chieh Chi Szu Hsiang Tui Tang Ti Ch'in Shih, Fan Tui Tang Nei Ti Yu Ch'ing Szu Hsiang (Peking: Jen Min Ch'u Pan She, 1952).

15. Survey of China Mainland Press (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 457 (November 1952), p. 25.

16. Survey of China Mainland Press (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 1026 (April 1955), pp. 7-9.

17. Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), Vol. I, p. 218.

18. Ibid., p. 190.

19. K.T.T.H., No. 6, January 27, 1961.

20. Jen Min Jih Pao, April 3, 1962.

21. K.T.T.H., No. 2, January 3, 1961.

22. K.T.T.H., No. 3, January 7, 1961.

23. K.T.T.H., No. 8, February 6, 1961.

24. J.W. Lewis, "The Leadership Doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party: The Lesson of the People's Commune," to be published in Asian Survey, October 1963.

25. See also the important Red Flag article on technical and scientific personnel in Selections From China Mainland Magazines, (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 332 (1962), pp. 1-5.

26. J. W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 113.

27. See, for example, Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), Vol. IV, pp. 41-42; and Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1950), pp. 110-111.

28. Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), Vol. I, p. 216.

29. Ibid:, p. 209.

30. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), p. 43.

31. Current Background (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 453 (1957), pp. 8-9.

32. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Report on the Rectification Campaign (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1957), p. 48.

33. Jen Min Jih Pao, July 1, 1961.

34. K.T.T.H., No. 11, March 2, 1961.

35. K.T.TH., No. 2, January 3, 1961.

36. K.T.T.H., No. 4, January 11, 1961.

37. K.T.T.H., No. 14, March 29, 1961.

38. K.T.T.H., No. 5, January 17, 1961.

39. K.T.T.H., No. 30, August 26, 1961.

40. Ibid.

41. K.T.T.H., No. 20, May 22, 1961.

42. See, for example, K.T.T.H., No. 11, March 2, 1961.

43. For a typical article, see Survey of China Mainland Press (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 2947 (1963), pp.2-4.

44. Klein, Donald W., The China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December, 1962), p.69.

45. Selections From China Mainland Magazines (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 351 (1963), p.1.

46. K.T.T.H., No. 13, March 20, 1961.

47. K.T.T.H., No. 26, July 13, 1961 and No. 8, February 6, 1961.

48. K.T.T.H., No. 3, January 7, 1961.

49. K.T.T.H., No. 8, February 6, 1961.

50. K.T.T.H., No. 16, April 19, 1961.

51. K.T.T.H., No. 17, April 25, 1961.

52. K.T.T.H., No. 26, July 13, 1961.

53. K.T.T.H., No. 17, April 25, 1961.

54. See also K.T.T.H., No. 14, March 29, 1961.

55. K.T.T.H., No. 17, April 25, 1961.

56. The author has attempted to analyze these pressures and opportunities in Current Scene, Vol. II, No. 7. (1963).

57. K.T.T.H., No. 8, February 6, 1961.

58. K.T.T.H., No. 17, April 25, 1961.

59. Ibid,

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. K.T.T.H., No. 7, February 1, 1961.

63. For example, K.T.T.H., No. 29, August 1, 1961, and No. 20, May 22, 1961.

64. For example, K.T.T.H., No. 10, February 20, 1961.

3/9/64 Ltr. William J. Nagle, Director, External Research Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

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